Evaluation of Incentive/Disincentive Contracting Methods for Highway Construction Projects by Gao, Ruifei
Purdue University
Purdue e-Pubs
College of Technology Directed Projects College of Technology Theses and Projects
4-13-2010
Evaluation of Incentive/Disincentive Contracting
Methods for Highway Construction Projects
Ruifei Gao
Purdue University - Main Campus, rgao@purdue.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/techdirproj
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.
Gao, Ruifei, "Evaluation of Incentive/Disincentive Contracting Methods for Highway Construction Projects" (2010). College of
Technology Directed Projects. Paper 6.
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/techdirproj/6
 






 Evaluation of Incentive/Disincentive Contracting Methods for Highway Construction 
Projects 
Ruifei Gao 









                                                                                                                                                                                       
EVALUATION OF I/D CONTRACTING METHOD    2 
 
Abstract 
Incentive/Disincentive (I/D) provisions are used by state highway agencies as a contract 
method when early completion is needed for a highway construction project. I/D can 
provide encouragement for contractors to complete highway construction projects by 
giving them incentives to finish ahead of the required schedule. The incentive amount 
should be enough to encourage contractors to accelerate their schedules while, at the 
same time, making up for any cost incur when doing so. Additionally, in order not to 
waste tax payers’ money, the incentives should be limited to a reasonable amount. Setting 
a cap for incentive is one of the most important procedures that Departments of 
Transportation (DOTs) undertake when drafting I/D contracts. This study evaluates 
different methods that have been used to set incentive and disincentive amounts for I/D 
contracts.  The advantages and disadvantages of these methods are then examined and 
analyzed. 
Keywords: Incentive/Disincentive Contracting, highway construction, I/D amount 
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Evaluation of Incentive/Disincentive Contracting Methods for Highway Construction 
Projects 
Since the 1990s, state highway agencies have begun to implement incentives and 
disincentives (I/D) contracts that aim for early completion of highway construction 
projects (Ellis and Pyeon 2005). Various I/D contracting plans include schedule-based 
I/D for early completion of work, cost-based I/D for reducing project costs, and 
performance-based I/D for improving project quality and safety. The design and 
implementation of schedule-based I/D are relatively easy and inexpensive (AbuHijileh 
and Ibbs 1989).  
Among these three I/D methods, early completion has been the most popular I/D 
plan for transportation construction projects. Its original design awarded the contractor 
with financial incentives to accelerate a schedule, and then decreased any user costs 
resulting from the inconvenience of the construction. On the other hand, if a project 
completion was delayed, financial disincentives would be collected from the contractor to 
make up for the loss of user costs. Thus far, I/D have been limited to only a few highway 
construction projects because of the increased effort involved. I/D contracts do not come 
without a price. I/D provisions require increased administration to determine when 
project targets have been reached (Jaraiedi, Plummer and Aber 1995). Also, the DOT 
staffs need to evaluate and decide if the amount of the incentive, as well as the amount of 
the disincentive, cap setting, and all relative provisions in the contracts is appropriate. 
Generally, I/D contracts are limited to those projects whose execution would severely 
disrupt highway traffic or highway services, significantly increase road user costs, 
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considerably affect adjacent neighborhoods and businesses, or complete a gap in the 
highway system to provide a major improvement (FHWA 1989). I/D are assessed on a 
daily basis and can be used to achieve specific milestones within a project or to 
encourage timely completion of the total contract (FDOT 1996–1997, 1997–1998).  
Because of the inherent character of the I/D contracting methods, both DOTs and 
contractors are cautious when selecting and dealing with them. This directed project will 
list, analyze, and summarize the methods proposed in the existing literature and 
documentation on setting incentive and disincentive amount for highway projects. 
Recommendations will be given based on the analysis. 
Statement of Problem 
I/D has been used in highway construction for more than 20 years, but it is still not 
a common highway contracting method. DOTs will only choose I/D when the projects 
need urgently to be finished.  
When setting the cap incentive amount for a project, the DOT needs not only to 
make the amount sufficient to compensate for the energy that the contractors will spend 
on  scheduling acceleration, but also to make sure the cost of the incentive is less than 
the public cost of delay caused by the construction. In other words, the DOT needs to 
provide a reasonable amount for the incentive to make sure it is attractive enough to 
motivate contractors to accelerate their schedules, while at the same time not wasting tax 
payers’ money. Therefore, when choosing I/D as the contracting method, one of the 
DOT’s essential assignments is to set an appropriate amount of incentive for the contract. 
Significance of Problem 
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Although setting cap incentive amounts is an important process in I/D contracting, 
there is no official regulation or rule to guide DOTs on how to actually do this. While the 
basic concept of using the I/D is simple, there is some variation (Shr and Chen 2004). 
The bottom line for determining I/D rates is that the rates should reflect the cost of 
savings/delays to the public and the savings/extra administrative costs to the DOTs 
(Herbsman 1995). The I/D amount should include various costs such as (1) safety of the 
users; (2) the loss of user time due to construction; (3) an increase in gasoline 
consumption; and (4) the increased administrative and monitoring associated with the use 
of an I/D contact (Jaraiedi 1995). Most DOTs employ the daily road user cost (RUC) as 
the basis for determining an appropriate I/D amount (Herbsman 1995). Some states, 
however, count on other parameters. DOTs are free to choose their own methods of 
determining incentive and disincentive amounts. Nevertheless, they do need some 
guidance to help them decide how to set these amounts. 
Statement of Purpose 
This directed project reviews the literature and summarizes different methods used 
for setting the incentive and disincentive amounts for I/D contracts. It also provides a 
comparison of different methods for setting incentive amount by examining selected case 
studies. Finally, the study concludes by identifying advantages and disadvantages of 
different methods and then providing some recommendations on how to choose an 
appropriate method for a specific contract. 
Definitions 
 Incentive/Disincentive contracting method: A highway construction contracting 
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method that awards the contractor with incentives for accelerating the schedule and 
then decreases users’ costs caused by the inconvenience of construction. It also 
collects the disincentives from the contractors to make up for the losses for users’ 
costs if a project’s completion is delayed (Ellis and Pyeon 2005).  
 Road User Cost (RUC): The estimated cost to the general public resulting from travel 
delays due to construction work or other incidents that impede traffic.  
 Cost of acceleration: The additional cost a contractor incurs due to expediting the 
delivery of a contract. This includes direct and indirect costs, profit, and additional 
markup.  
 Liquidated damages: A monetary component included in some construction contracts 
to encourage completion of the project or a segment of the project by a specified date. 
Assumptions 
This directed project is based upon the following assumptions: 
1. DOTs need some guidance to help them set incentive and disincentive amounts for 
I/D contracts; 
2. There should be at least one method among the different methods used for setting 
incentive and disincentive amounts that is better suited for a specific I/D contract than 
other methods; 
3. The data that is used in the case study of this project is historical data of Florida DOT 
obtained from Shr and Chen (2004) published report. The unknown or inaccessible 
part of the data, which is necessary for calculation, is assumed as the normal situation 
(roadway project type and normal market conditions). 
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Delimitations 
This directed project includes the following delimitations: 
1. The methods indicated and analyzed in this study are the ones that exist and have 
been detailed in prior literature;  
2. All of the I/D contracting plans mentioned in this study, except the ones that have 
been specified, are schedule-based I/D and linear I/D; 
3. This study is focused on research done within the United States. Relevant issues that 
involve some locale other than the US will not be discussed in this study; 
4. This study aims to provide a guide that can be referred to by DOTs whenever 
necessary.  It does not aim to set standards for I/D contracts. 
Limitations 
This directed project involves the following limitations: 
1. Methods that likely exist and have been used by some DOTs but have never appeared 
in published literature are not included in the analysis of this study; 
2. The analysis and conclusion of this study are based only on the assumptions, data, 
and results of the case studies included within and, as much, may not be suitable for 
all situations. 
Literature Review 
The I/D contracting method usually implements I/D clauses to the typical low bid 
method. The DOT pays incentive fees to the contractor, based on each day that the 
contractor can complete the project ahead of schedule. Likewise, each day beyond the 
completion date will cost contractor a disincentive fee. The FHWA Technical Advisory 
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(1989) proposes that daily incentive rates and daily disincentive rates should be equal. If 
different rates have been set for incentives and disincentives, it is recommended that the 
daily incentive rate should not exceed the daily disincentive rate.  
The DOT also sets a cap for the total incentive fee, which means the contractor can 
earn no more than this amount by accelerating the schedule. The cap incentive amount is 
usually set at a certain percentage of the contract amount, a certain dollar amount, or a set 
number of days that will be paid (Sillars 2007). Most DOTs choose a cap of five percent 
of the total contract amount. According to FHWA Technical Advisory, a cap for 
disincentive should not exist, though some DOTs set equal caps amount for both the 
incentive and disincentive (Anderson and Russell 2001).  The existence of cap for 
incentive denotes that when the completion date is ahead of schedule, and at some point 
the DOT pays the incentives, both the DOT and the contractor will benefit from the 
schedule acceleration; however, when the completion date is either beyond the schedule 
or it is before the ‘incentive days’, the benefit to either the DOT or the contractor, or both, 
will be decreased. 
For highway construction projects that are in critical need of early completion, I/D 
has effectively led to positive outcomes. Although the percentage of cases using I/D as a 
contracting method is relatively small when compared to those using other contracting 
methods, the use of I/D remains promising. A fairly high ratio of cases using I/D has 
ended with the early completions expected by the owners. Arditi, Khisty and Yasamis 
(1997) state that, of the 28 highway construction projects conducted by Illinois DOT 
during 1989 and 1993, 79% received full incentives and 21% received partial incentive 
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payments. Rister and Wang (2004) note that, between January of 1999 and December of 
2002, 32 highway construction projects in Kentucky were selected to use I/D contracting 
methods (including both entire contracts and partial contracts). Among the 32 projects, 
approximately $10,868,395 has been paid out in incentive fees, and $21,500 has been 
collected in disincentive fees. 
Background  
Although there is no official standard for setting incentive amounts, it has been 
accepted and implemented by most DOTs that the incentive amount should be between 
Road User Costs (RUC) and the extra acceleration cost to the contractors (Herbsman, 
Glagola 1995). Sillars (2007), in his report for the Oregon DOT, formulated an equation, 
CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC to express the relationship of I/D. The lower boundary of the 
equation is the contractor’s cost caused by acceleration (CA), which should be less than 
incentive amount; otherwise there is no reason for the contractor to accelerate the 
schedule if the incentive cannot cover the cost. The upper boundary of the equation is 
Road User Costs (RUC), which should be greater than the incentive amount; otherwise, it 
is meaningless to accelerate the schedule, since an incentive amount greater than RUC 
will cost the public even more than if no acceleration were to happen. As DOTs decide 
the incentive amount, they should, at minimum, ensure that it complies with Sillars’ 
equation. 
According to Sillars (2007), the estimation of the equation’s upper boundary RUC 
has been performed, and its method has now been accepted widely by most agencies. For 
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the estimation of the equation’s lower boundary CA, however, there are few 
working-level techniques and no commonly accepted method.  
Incentive/Disincentive Amount Setting Models 
There are several models provided in the literature that can be applicable to DOTs 
when deciding the amount of the incentive/disincentive. They are as follows: 
Shr and Chen’s model. 
Shr and Chen (2004) have developed a model that can determine a reasonable 
incentive amount for construction projects. Based on the data collected from Florida 
DOT, this model provides a method for determining the optimum incentive days and 
incentive amount by putting the incentive/disincentive factor into a functional 
relationship between the construction cost and the project duration. 
Based on the historical data collected from Florida DOT, the fitted model of 
regression appears as: 
[(C-C0)/C0]=0.03214+0.10481[(D-D0)/D0] +0.46572[(D-D0)/D0]2 (1) 
where  C=Final Construction Cost 
 D=Days Used 
 C0=Award Bid 
 D0=Final Contract Time 
 Perform the procedures of shifting: (1) determine (D0,C0); (2) Determine the 
functional relationship between construction cost and time duration by using the set of 
(D0,C0) and Eq. 1; (3) Locate the point of minimum construction cost (D1,C1);(4) 
Calculate the distance between (D0,C0) and (D1,C1); (5) Shift the functional relationship 
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between the construction cost and the time duration using the distance obtain in the last 
step and let  (D1,C1) match (D0,C0). After shifting, Equation 2 is developed as: 
C=1.0059C0+0.1048C0 [(D-1.1125D0)/D0] +0.4657C0 [(D-1.1125D0)/D0]2  (2) 
In Eq. 2, it is assumed that every project has an internal relationship between the 
construction cost and project duration. The functional relationship between the two is 
determined at the same time as (D0, C0) is decided.  
Due to the procedure of I/D contract, Incentive/Disincentive relationship is defined 
as:  
T= (I) × (D-D1)  (3) 
where  T=The Anticipated Maximum I/D Amount 
 I=Daily Linear I/D Amount  
 D=Construction Time 
 D1=Contract Time 
Put Incentive/Disincentive relationship into Eq. 2: 
C=1.0059C0+0.1.48C0 [(D-1.1125D0)/D0] +0.4657C0 [(D-1.1125D0)/D0]2+ (I) × (D-D1)  
  (4) 
where  D0=Construction Cost Estimate 
 D1=Contract Time Estimate 
Before the bid, there is no way to obtain D0, so it is set that D0=D1. 
Construction Time (D) =D0-1.0736× [(I×D02)/C0]  (5) 
Finally, the anticipated maximum days for incentive and the anticipated maximum 
incentive will be: 
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Anticipated Maximum Days for Incentive= (D1-D)  (6) 
Anticipated Maximum Incentive=I (D1-D)  (7) 
This model is only appropriate for the estimation of linear I/D contracts. The 
authors suggest that an engineer’s cost and time estimates can be used to run this model. 
After bidding, the contractor’s award bid and contract time can be also used to run this 
model and calculate the anticipated maximum days for incentive and the anticipated 
maximum incentive. 
 Though this model is developed according to the historical data from Florida DOT 
projects, it can be adopted by any state DOT for a similar situation. However, the 
functional relationship between the construction cost and duration needs to be developed 
by the client based on construction type, location, and economic factors. Additionally, it 
should be noted that this model is project-dependent only. 
Sillars and Riedl’s model. 
Sillars and Riedl (2007) conclude that the previous incentive amount setting 
methods usually consider one of two factors: (1) uses of RUCs; and (2) broad analysis of 
the cost of time changes to the contractors, using global bid result information. However, 
the congestion and the RUCs for a given segment of highway could continue to be 
increased along with growth in population and urbanization. Therefore, considering only 
the RUCs for incentive amounts given to contractors could cause the amount to be 
substantially higher than what is required to accelerate the work. Thus, Sillars and Riedl’s 
model is based on the reflection of contractors’ project economics. 
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This model is divided in two stages. In Stage 1, the profit of the project and the 
proportion of construction project cost categories (e.g., labor, material, equipment, etc.) 
are worked out. In Stage 2, the proportion established in Stage 1 is adjusted for the I/D 
amount according to experts’ engineering judgment, and the estimated I/D amount is 
calculated according to the adjustment of the proportion.  
Aside from the total cost of a project, the profit of the project may also be relevant 
to the project type and the market conditions. Based on Carr and Beyor’s (2004) formula 
and exploration of Oregon DOT, a formula of predicted highway construction project 
profit has been articulated as followed: 
P= f / [log (C) m] (8) 
where  P= forecasted profit at bid time 
 f=factor representing project type  
 C=estimated total project cost 
 m=factor representing the market condition.  
The value of f-factor and m-factor are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 below. 
 
Table 1  
f-Factor Used in Incentive Determination Model 
Project Type Description f-Factor 
A Roadway 1 
B Interchange 1.1 
C Bridge 1.25 
D Complex 1.35 
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Table 2  
m-Factor Used in Incentive Determination Model 
Market Condition  Description m-Factor 
AA Busy 1.4 
BB Normal  1.5 
CC Slow 1.6 
   
 
The authors came up with a broad breakdown of the total costs of a project (see 
Table 3 below). The purpose of this breakdown is to provide a starting point for the 
calculation of a particular project, for which the user needs to adjust the proportion based 
on the original one, according to the engineering judgment and reflection of the 
accelerated segment. Then, the user must estimate the impact of acceleration to cost (i.e., 
percentage impact of acceleration to each element of the cost), based on engineering 
judgment. At this point, the acceleration cost is obtained from calculation. This 
acceleration cost is the lower boundary (CA) of the incentive amount, and RUC is the 
upper boundary. Based on engineering judgment, the user decides upon a final incentive 
amount that falls between these two boundaries. 
This model provides a method that focuses on a particular project’s unique 
characteristics, instead of relying on a one-size-fits-all algorithm. Due to the secretive 
nature of the highway bidding process, the using of engineering judgment is vital. 
Percentage as maximum incentive amount (PMI) method. 
The method most commonly used by DOTs to decide daily I/D amount and cap 
amount is Percentage as Maximum Incentive Amount. It is simple to use and requires no 
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complicated calculation or historical data collection/analysis. As a result, this method has 
been widely accepted as the regular approach to setting I/D amounts. DOTs have 
different ways of setting the maximum percentage used in this method, but 5% is 
commonly used. Under special circumstances, the fixed percentage amount set by the 
DOT may be exceeded after approval by a relative agency. This study will use 5% as the 
default percentage when calculating for this method. 
The daily I/D amount is calculated by dividing 5% of the total contract amount by 
the I/D time, which is the number of days that the contractor can use to accelerate a 
project. According to WVDOT (2003), the I/D time is usually decided by the following 
process: (1) The number of days of a normal schedule is the total working time in hours 
divided by a selected normal number of working hours (such as eight hours per day for 
five working days per week); (2) The number of days of an accelerated schedule is the 
total working time in hours divided by a selected accelerated number of working hours 
(such as 16 hours per day for six working days per week); (3) Subtracting the number of 
days of the normal schedule by the number of days of the accelerated schedule equals I/D 
time, which is the maximum number of days the contractor can save by accelerating the 
schedule.  
It should be noted that, to avoid making the incentive days too long, the calculation 
of the normal number of working hours sometimes uses an aggressive pace of work, such 
as ten working hours per day multiplied five working days per week. 
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After the above calculation is performed, justification is sometimes necessary. A 
process must then conducted to verify that the I/D amount falls between the CA and the 
RUC. 
Conclusion 
There is a modest amount of literature on the various I/D amount-setting models 
that are applicable to this study and thus can be used as references when a DOT is trying 
to set a reasonable I/D amount for highway construction project using the I/D contracting 
method. The principles of these methods may vary, but nearly all are based on the  
relationship of CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC. However, the application, effectiveness, and 
practical use of these models still needs to be verified.  
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Table 3  
Sub-element Breakdown of Project Costs 
Elementa  Sub-elementb Value 
Roadway Interchange Bridge Complex 
Direct cost     82% 78%    79%   77% 
  Labor 25% 30% 30% 33% 
  Materials 45% 35% 30% 37% 
  Equipment 30% 35% 40% 30% 
Indirect cost      6% 9%     8%    9% 
  Supervision 2% 3% 2% 4% 
  Time-related facilities 1% 1% 1% 1% 
  Non-time-related facilities 1% 1% 1% 1% 
  Mobilization/demobilization 3% 5% 5% 5% 
  Insurance and taxes 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Markup      12% 13%     13%   14% 
  Risk 3% 5% 5% 6% 
  Home Office G&A    8%      8%   8% 8% 
  Profit (Calculated Separately)     
aStated as a percentage of total project cost. 
bStated as a percentage of total direct cost
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Analysis of the Models 
The I/D amount setting methods discussed in this study are analyzed both 
qualitatively and quantitatively.  
Shr and Chen’s Model 
Shr and Chen’s model’s equation is based on historical data and used regression 
analysis. By only knowing the contract amount and the contract time of a particular 
project, the anticipated maximum days for incentive can be predicted. Then, by 
calculating the daily RUC, the anticipated maximum incentive for the project can be 
obtained.  
The traits of Shr and Chen’s model are: 
1. It can only be used for the prediction of the maximum days for incentive or maximum 
incentive for I/D contracts;  
2. It is easy to use. Simply put in the data (construction duration and construction cost) 
of a particular project at an exact stage (DOT’s estimate, contractor’s bid or final data 
at the end of the project) to run the model, and the result will be obtained; 
3. As stated above, this model can be used many times during different stages of the 
project to adjust the days of incentive and the corresponding daily incentive amount 
whenever needed; 
4. The model depends on other resources to obtain the daily RUC, which is needed in 
the process of calculation; 
5. The original data that has been used to obtain this equation is from FDOT projects. 
Therefore, the equation provided by Shr and Chen’s research is only suitable for the 
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use of FDOT project. However, this model can be adopted by other DOTs. The 
functional relationship of construction cost and construction duration in the equation 
needs to be developed by other DOTs’ own historical projects. Thus, the functional 
relationship developed by the exact DOT suits for the location, construction type, and 
economic factors in the exact area well. 
Sillars and Riedl’s Model 
Sillars and Riedl’s model does not require the support of historical data. It involves 
breaking down the construction costs, estimating the contractor’s cost of accelerating the 
work (CA), and then adding incentive profit to obtain the final incentive amount for a 
project.  
Through analysis, the traits of Sillars and Riedl’s model are: 
1. It does not employ a one-fits-all algorithm. It focuses more on the particular project 
that is being estimated. Therefore, the model could possibly estimate one project 
possibly more accurately. 
2. It takes account of an array of factors (project type, project size and market condition) 
that comprise a particular project. This makes the model more accurate to estimate the 
incentive amount. 
3. The process of using this model to estimate the incentive amount is relatively difficult. 
Unlike other models designed for the same aim, Sillars and Riedl’ model cannot be 
used by simply inputting the data in an equation and then getting a result by solving 
the equation. This model requires a fair amount of analysis and calculation, which 
makes the result more accurate for a particular project’s estimation. 
 EVALUATION OF I/D CONTRACTING METHOD    20 
 
4. Apart from analysis and calculation, the model also requires an engineer’s judgment 
when estimating the changed percentage in each sub-element caused by the 
acceleration. Though it has not been specified particularly in the article, additional 
engineering judgment might be needed at the beginning of stage two when using this 
model. The percentage of each segment from the original breakdown is used as 
starting point and needs to be adjusted according to the specific project by the 
engineer’s judgment. 
5. The number of days that could be used for acceleration is not provided through the 
calculation of this model. It needs to be determined manually. 
6. The final result from this model may need to be verified by the equation that 
expresses the original relationship of I/D amount: CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC. 
Percentage as Maximum Incentive (PMI) Amount Method 
Percentage as maximum incentive amount method is widely used by DOTs as 
incentive amount setting method. The use of this method does not have a standard or 
specific procedure. DOTs decide how to conduct the calculation when using this method. 
The method does not have much reasoning or equations for back up, and depends upon 
the accumulated experience from prior historical projects and rules set by DOTs. 
Through analysis, the traits of PMI method are: 
1. When using the method, DOTs have different default amount for their incentive 
amount setting. As listed in Table 4 below, DOTs cap rates can be decided by fixed 
percentage of contract amount, fixed dollar amount, and various negotiable ways. 
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2. The method does not contain any complicated calculation, nor require an engineer’s 
judgment. Therefore, once the fixed percentage or dollar amount is decided, it is 
relatively simple to use.  
3. While simple to use, it lacks of a solid scientific foundation, and therefore, lacks the 
accuracy of the previous two models. 
4. The final results may still need to be verified by using the equation: CA ≤ I / D ≤ 
RUC. 
 
Table 4  
Incentive/Disincentive Cap Rates for Various State Highway Agencies (Herbsman, Chen 
and Epstien 1995; Shr and Chen 2004) 
State Cap 
Alabama None 
Arizona  ±30days 
Arkansas  None 
California  Dollar Amounta 
Colorado None 
Delaware None 
Florida  Varies 
Georgia  None 
Idaho  Varies 
Illinois None 
Indiana  Dollar Amountc 
Iowa  None 
Kansas Dollar Amounta 
Maine Dollar Amountc 
Maryland 5% 
Massachusetts  None 
 EVALUATION OF I/D CONTRACTING METHOD    22 
 
Michigan  5% 
Minnesota  None 
Missouri  10% 
Montana  Varies 
Nevada Varies 
New Hampshire None 
New Jersey Dollars 100,000 
New York 10% 
North Carolina  Varies 
North Dakota  5% 
Ohio  5% 
Pennsylvania  5% 
South Dakota  None 
Tennessee  None 
Utah  Dollar Amountc 
Virginia  Dollar Amountb 
Washington  5% 
Wisconsin  Varies 
Wyoming  6-8% 
aFixed. 
bFixed except the A+B contracts. 
cFixed or negotiated not available. 
 
Conclusion 
As stated above, the three models discussed in this research have apparent 
differences, as well as some common attributes. These are summarized in Table 5 below.  
 
Table 5  
Comparison of the Incentive Amount Setting Methods 
  
  
Incentive Amount Setting Method 




Percentage as maximum 
incentive amount method 
Whether Used Widely Not Sure Not Sure Yes 
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Engineer's Judgment 
Involved Yes Yes, a lot No 
Simple to Use 
Yes, once the 
equation is given No Yes 
Whether Have 
Reasoning Process Yes Yes No 
Based on CA ≤ I / D 
≤ RUC Yes Yes Yes 
Need Daily RUC in 
the Calculation Yes Yes No 
 
Case Study 
Due to the limited accessibility of DOT’s historical data and information, some of 
the information used in this study is assumed according to the normal situation (roadway 
project type and normal market conditions).  
Case Study 1: FDOT Project FM210623 
Project FM210623’s award bid and contract time, as estimated by FDOT, are 
$9,213,000 and 650 days, respectively. The daily RUC for that portion is $5,992. The 
following sections show the outcomes for running each model with the data of Project 
FM210623. 
Shr and Chen’s model. 
When applying the Shr and Chen’s model to Project FM210623’s data, (650, 9213) 
is given as (D0, C0) and 5.992 is given as I in Equation 5 and Equation 6. The specific 
calculation is as followed: 
D  = D0-1.0736× [(I×D02)/C0] 
 = 650-1.0736 × [(5.992 × 6502)/9213] 
 = 650-295 
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 = 355 (days) 
The maximum days for incentive= 650-355=295 (days) 
The maximum incentive = $5,992 × 295= $ 1,767,640 
Sillars and Riedl’s model.          
When applying the Sillars and Riedl’s model to Project FM210623’s data, 
$9,213,000 is given as total project estimate and, based on the result of running Shr and 
Chen’s model above, 295 is used as reasonable number of acceleration days (at the very 
least, it can be said that 295 is a reasonable number of days that cannot be exceeded by 
incentive days). It is assumed that Project FM210623’s project type is roadway and its 
market conditions are normal. So the factor f and factor m can be read from Table 1 and 
Table 2 respectively, and the values are 1.00 and 1.50 respectively. Also, the breakdown 
percentage of roadway is applied to Project FM210623’s stage I value. 
The basic information of Project FM210623 is summarized in Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6  




Total Project Estimate 
Reasonable Acceleration Days 
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The value of f (1.00) and m (1.50) and the project value ($9,213,000) are inserted 
into Equation8 to calculate the profit value. The result is 1.00/[log($9,213,000)1.50] = 
9.0%. The percentage breakdown of roadway from Table 3 is used as the stage I value, 
and 9.0% is inserted as the stage I value of profit. The result of this process is shown in 
Table 7 below.  
 
Table 7  
Project FM210623 Stage I Value 
Elementa Sub-elementb Stage I Value  







































a Stated as a percentage of total project cost 
b Stated as a percentage of total direct cost 
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After the starting point of the breakdown percentage is provided, the percentage is 
adjusted to better reflect of the reality of the actual project. According to Table 7 above, 
the starting point percentage of labor for roadway project is 25%. However, the need of 
acceleration may result in a higher percentage of labor being requested. It is assumed that 
the user increases the labor percentage value to 30%, and then the percentage values of 
material and/or equipment are decreased for the purpose of maintaining the total cost at 
100%. The same process of adjustment is carried out for each percentage of the 
sub-element in the table. According to the adjusted percentage value, the portion specific 
value is obtained.  The percentage adjustment and portion specific value for each part is 
shown in Table 8 below.  
 
Table 8  
State II Adjustment of Project FM210623 








81% 76% 7,001,880 
 Labor 25% 25% 1,750,470
 Materials 45% 45% 3,150,846
 Equipment 30% 30% 2,100,564




6% 8% 770,207 
 Supervision 2% 2% 140,038
 Time-related 
facilities 1% 1% 70,019
 Non-time-related 
facilities 1% 1% 70,019
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 Mobilization/demobi
lization 3% 5% 350,094
 Insurance and taxes 1% 2% 140,038
Markup  12% 15% 1,715,461 
 Risk 3% 5% 350,094
 Home office G&A 8% 10% 700,188
 Profit  9.0% 9.50% 665,179
Total   100% 9,487,547 
a Stated as a percentage of total project cost 
b Stated as a percentage of total direct cost 
         
Once the actual percentage of each sub-element is estimated, the percentage 
increase (or decrease) of each sub-element caused by the acceleration is estimated 
through project knowledge and engineering judgment. It is assumed that double shifting 
is necessary for the acceleration, and the labor element is assumed to increase by 20%. 
From Table 8 above, the portion specific value for labor is $1,750,470. So, the 
acceleration cost for labor is $1,750,470 × 20% = $350,094. Except the profit portion, the 
same process of acceleration impact estimation is carried out for each sub-element. The 
result of acceleration impact estimation and the calculation of acceleration cost are shown 
in Table 9 below. 
 
Table 9  
Acceleration Impact of Project FM210623 








7,001,880 8% 465,625 
 Labor 1,750,470 20% 350,094
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 Materials 3,150,846 5% 157,542
 Equipment 2,100,564 -2% (42,011)




770,207 1% 10,503 
 Supervision 140,038 10% 14,004
 Time-related 
facilities 70,019 -5% (3,501)
 Non-time-related 
facilities 70,019 0 -
 Mobilization/demob
ilization 350,094 0 -
 Insurance and taxes 140,038 0 -
Markup  1,715,461 12% 175,047 
     
 Risk 350,094 50% 175,047
 Home office G&A 700,188 0% -
 Profit  665,179  
Total  9,487,547 8% 651,175 
a Stated as a percentage of total project cost 
b Stated as a percentage of total direct cost 
         
 According to Table 9 above, the total cost caused by the acceleration is $651,175. 
This value is actually the total contractor’s cost caused by acceleration (CA). The 
incentive should include some profit besides the CA. Sillars and Riedl provide a method 
for calculating the profit’s neutral value (i.e., the lowest point of reward to the contractor 
as an incentive profit). The profit neutral value is the result of direct cost’s acceleration 
cost ($465,625) times the project specific value of profit percentage in Table 8 above 
(9.5%). So the profit neutral value is $465,625 × 9.5% = $44,234. The actual profit that is 
offered to the contractor should be higher than the neutral value to encourage acceleration. 
It is assumed that the profit is three times that of the neutral value, which in this case is 
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$44,234 × 3= $132,702. According to the calculation, the final incentive amount is 
$651,175 + $132,702 = $783,877. The whole process of calculating Project FM210623’s 
incentive amount using Sillars and Riedl’s model is shown in Table 10 below. 
Percentage as maximum incentive amount (PMI) method. 
When applying the percentage as maximum incentive amount method to Project 
FM210623’s data, it is assumed that the percentage value is 5%. Therefore, the incentive 
amount for Project FM210623 is $9,213,000 × 5% = $460,650. It is assumed that the 
normal schedule uses an aggressive pace of work (ten working hours per day multiplied 
by five working days per week), and the accelerated schedule uses an accelerated pace of 
work (16 working hours per day multiplied by six days per week). The calculation of 
incentive days using the percentage as maximum incentive amount method is as follows: 
The total weeks of normal schedule = 650days/7days = 93 weeks 
The total hours needed = 10hours per day × 5days per week ×93 weeks = 
4650hours 
The working hours per week of accelerated schedule = 16hours per day × 6days per 
week = 96 hours per week 
The total weeks of accelerated schedule = 4650hours/96hours per week = 48 weeks 
The total days of accelerated schedule = 48weeks × 7days per week = 336days 
The maximum incentive days = 650days – 336days = 314 days 
Summary of Case Study 1. 
The results of calculating Project FM210623’s incentive amount and incentive 
duration using the three models are shown in Table 11 below. According to the values 
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obtained from the calculation of each model, there are differences among the results from 
the three models. The incentive amount calculated by the Shr and Chen’s model 
($1,767,640) is the largest among the three. Theoretically, it can be set as the maximum 
incentive amount which is used more for the purpose of controlling the incentive amount 
under the total RUC, rather than as the final specific incentive amount value. The 
incentive amount calculated by PMI method ($460,650) is the smallest among the three. 
The amount could save the most capital for the DOTs. However, it might not have 
enough encouragement for the contractors to accelerate the schedules. Moreover, 
compared with the result calculated by the Sillars and Riedl’s model, it is very probably 
under the reasonable contractor’s cost caused by acceleration (CA). The incentive amount 
calculated by Sillars and Riedl’s model ($783,877) is more reasonable compared with the 
other two results, and it can be set as the specific incentive amount value, not the 
maximum incentive amount. The comparison of the incentive amount calculated by each 
method is shown in Figure 1 below.  
As to the calculation of incentive duration by each model, only the Shr and Chen’s 
model and the percentage as maximum incentive amount method have included the 
calculation of incentive duration. The results of the two models are close to each other. 
The result of the percentage as maximum incentive amount method (314 days) is 6% 
larger than the result of the Shr and Chen’s model (295 days). Before the calculation of 
the Sillars and Riedl’s model, a reasonable number of acceleration days needs to be given. 
So, the calculation of the Sillars and Riedl’s model might need to depend on another 
model.  
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Table 10  
Sillars and Riedl’s model Incentive Determination User Screen of Project FM210623 
Project FM210623 
 
    
Type Roadway     
Market Condition Normal      
Total Project Estimate 9,213,000      
Total Project Direct 
Cost Estimate 7,001,880      
Reasonable 
Acceleration Days 295      
Estimated  RUC/Day 5,992      
       








Cost (+/- $) 
Direct cost  81% 76% 7,001,880 8% 465,625 
 Labor 25% 25% 1,750,470 20% 350,094
 Materials 45% 45% 3,150,846 5% 157,542
 Equipment 30% 30% 2,100,564 -2% (42,011)
 Subcontractor 0% 0% 0 0% -
Indirect cost  6% 8% 770,207 1% 10,503 
 Supervision 2% 2% 140,038 10% 14,004
 Time-related 
facilities 1% 1% 70,019 -5% (3,501)
 Non-time-related 
facilities 1% 1% 70,019 0 -
 Mobilization/demo
bilization 3% 5% 350,094 0 -
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 Insurance and 
taxes 1% 2% 140,038 0 -
Markup  12% 15% 1,715,461 12% 175,047 
 Risk 3% 5% 350,094 50% 175,047
 Home office G&A 8% 10% 700,188 0% -
 Profit  9.0% 9.50% 665,179  
Total   100% 9,487,547 8% 651,175 
       
Acceleration Cost 651,175     
I/D Incentive Profit 132,703    
Total Incentive Amount 783,878     
aStated as a percentage of total project cost 
b Stated as a percentage of total direct cost
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Table 11  
Comparison of Incentive Amount and Incentive Duration of Project FM210623 
Calculated by Three Models 
Model Incentive Amount ($) Incentive Duration (days)
   
Shr and Chen’s Model 1,767,640 295 
Sillars and Riedl’s Model 783,877 - 
PMI Method 460,650 314 
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Figure 1. Case Study 1 Incentive Amount Comparison 
 
Case Study 2: FDOT Project FM229629 
Project FM229629’s award bid and contract time estimated by FDOT are 
$3,849,000 and 485 days, respectively. The daily RUC for that portion is $2,700. The 
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following sections show the outcomes of running each model using the data of Project 
FM229629. 
Shr and Chen’s model. 
Using (485, 3829) as (D0, C0) and applying Equation 5 and Equation 6, the process 
of calculation is shown below: 
D  = D0 - 1.0736× [(I×D02)/C0] 
 = 485- 1.0736× (2.7×4852/3829) 
 = 485-177 
 = 308 (days) 
The maximum days for incentive= 485-308=177 (days) 
The maximum incentive amount= $2,700 × 177 days=$477,900 
Sillars and Riedl’s model. 
The same assumptions (project type, market condition, specific sub-element 
percentage breakdown, acceleration impact, and how many times I/D incentive profit 
value is more than the neutral profit value) are made when applying Sillars and Riedl’s 
model to Project FM229629. The calculation result of Project FM229629’s incentive 
amount using Sillars and Riedl’s model is shown in Table 12 below. 
The calculation of Sillars and Riedl’s model shows that Project FM229629 has an 
acceleration cost of $272,047, and an incentive profit of $55,441. The total incentive 
amount of Project FM238320 is $327,488. 
Percentage as maximum incentive amount (PMI) method. 
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When applying the PMI method to Project FM229629’s data, the same assumptions 
(percentage value of incentive amount, normal schedule pace of work and accelerated 
schedule pace of work) are made as the ones applied to Project FM210623 when using 
the other two methods. So the incentive amount for Project FM229629 is $3,849,000 × 
5% = $192,450. The calculation of incentive days using the percentage as maximum 
incentive amount method is as followed: 
The total weeks of normal schedule = 485days/7days = 69 weeks 
The total hours needed = 10hours per day × 5days per week ×69 weeks = 
3464hours           
The working hours per week of accelerated schedule = 16hours per day × 6days per 
week = 96 hours per week 
The total weeks of accelerated schedule = 3464hours/96hours per week = 36 weeks 
The total days of accelerated schedule = 36weeks × 7days per week = 253days 
The maximum incentive days = 485days – 253days = 232 days 
Summary of Case Study 2. 
The results of calculating Project FM229629’s incentive amount and incentive 
duration using the three models are shown in Table 13 below. 
The differences among the results calculated by three models are similar with those 
in Case Study 1. The Shr and Chen’s model has the largest incentive amount ($477,900), 
while the percentage as maximum incentive amount method has the smallest result of 
incentive amount ($192,450). The result of the Sillars and Riedl’s model falls in between 
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the results of other two models. The comparison of the incentive amount calculated by 
each method is shown in Figure 2 below.    
 
Table 13  
Comparison of Incentive Amount and Incentive Duration of Project FM229629 
Calculated by Three Models 
Model Incentive Amount ($) Incentive Duration (days)
Shr and Chen’s Model 477,900 177 
Sillars and Riedl’s Model 327,488 - 
PMI Method 192,450 232 
 
The incentive durations of the Shr and Chen’s model and the percentage as 
maximum incentive amount method are not as close to each other as that in Case Study 1. 
The incentive duration calculated by the percentage as maximum incentive amount 
method (232 days) is 31% larger than that calculated the Shr and Chen’s model (177 
days). 
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Table 12  
Sillars and Riedl’s model Incentive Determination User Screen of Project FM229629 
Project FM229629      
Type Roadway      
Market Condition Normal      
Total Project Estimate 3,849,000      
Total Project Direct 
Cost Estimate 2,925,240      
Reasonable 
Acceleration Days 177      
Estimated  RUC/Day 2,700      
       








Cost (+/- $) 
Direct cost  81% 76% 2,925,240 8% 194,528 
 Labor 25% 25% 731,310 20% 146,262
 Materials 45% 45% 1,316,358 5% 65,818
 Equipment 30% 30% 877,572 -2% (17,551)
 Subcontractor 0% 0% 0 0% -
     
Indirect cost  6% 8% 321,776 1% 4,388 








1% 29,252 0 -
 Mobilization/demo 3% 5% 146,262 0 -






2% 58,505 0 -
     
Markup  12% 15% 716,684 12% 73,131 
 Risk 3% 5% 146,262 50% 73,131
 Home office G&A 8% 10% 292,524 0% -
 Profit  9.5% 9.50% 277,898  
Total   100% 3,963,700 8% 272,047 
       
Acceleration Cost 272,047     
I/D Incentive Profit 55,441   
Total Incentive Amount 327,488     
aStated as a percentage of total project cost 
b Stated as a percentage of total direct cost
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Figure 2. Case Study 2 Incentive Amount Comparison 
 
Case Study 3: FDOT Project FM238320 
Project FM238320’s award bid and contract time estimated by FDOT are 
$7,534,000 and 485 days, respectively. The daily RUC for that portion is $3,500. The 
following steps are running each model with the data of Project FM238320. 
Shr and Chen’s model. 
Using (485, 7534) as (D0,C0) and applying Equation 5 and Equation 6, the process 
of calculation is shown below: 
D  = D0 - 1.0736× [(I×D02)/C0] 
 = 485- 1.0736× (3.5×4852/7534) 
 = 485-117 
 = 368 (days) 
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The maximum days for incentive= 485-368=117 (days) 
The maximum incentive amount= $3,500 × 117 days=$409,500 
Sillars and Riedl’s model. 
The same assumptions (project type, market condition, specific sub-element 
percentage breakdown, acceleration impact, and how many times I/D incentive profit 
value is more than the neutral profit value) are made when applying Sillars and Riedl’s 
model to Project FM238320. The calculation results of Project FM238320’s incentive 
amount using Sillars and Riedl’s model is shown in Table 14 below. 
The calculation of Sillars and Riedl’s model shows that Project FM238320 has an 
acceleration cost of $532,503, and an incentive profit of $109,661. The total incentive 
amount of Project FM238320 is $642,164. 
Percentage as maximum incentive amount (PMI) method. 
When applying the PMI method to Project FM238320’s data, the same assumptions 
(percentage value of incentive amount, normal schedule pace of work and accelerated 
schedule pace of work) are made as those applied to Project FM210623 when using the 
other two methods. So the incentive amount for Project FM238320 is $7,534,000 × 5% = 
$376,700. The calculation of incentive days using the percentage as maximum incentive 
amount method is as followed: 
The total weeks of normal schedule = 485days/7days = 69 weeks 
The total hours needed = 10hours per day × 5days per week ×69 weeks = 
3464hours           
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The working hours per week of accelerated schedule = 16hours per day × 6days per 
week = 96 hours per week 
The total weeks of accelerated schedule = 3464hours/96hours per week = 36 weeks 
The total days of accelerated schedule = 36weeks × 7days per week = 253days 
The maximum incentive days = 485days – 253days = 232 days 
Summary of Case Study 3. 
The results of calculating Project FM238320’s incentive amount and incentive 
duration using the three models are shown in Table 15 below. According to the results 
obtained from the three models, there are still apparent differences. However, the 
differences among the results are not similar with the differences in the previous two case 
studies. The Sillars and Riedl’s model has the largest value of incentive amount 
($642,164) among the three. The percentage as maximum incentive amount method still 
has the smallest value of incentive amount ($376,700). The incentive amount calculated 
by the Shr and Chen’s model ($409,500) falls in between the other two results. The 
comparison of the incentive amount calculated by each method is shown in Figure 3 
below. 
The two results of the incentive days are no longer close to one another. The larger 
result calculated by the PMI method (232 days) is nearly two times the amount calculated 
by the Shr and Chen’s model (117 days).  
 
Table 15  
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Comparison of Incentive Amount and Incentive Duration of Project FM238320 
Calculated by Three Models 
Model Incentive Amount ($) Incentive Duration (days)
Shr and Chen’s Model 409,500 117 
Sillars and Riedl’s Model 642,164 - 
PMI Method 376,700 232 
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Figure 3. Case Study 3 Incentive Amount Comparison 
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Table 14  
Sillars and Riedl’s model Incentive Determination User Screen of Project FM238320 
Project FM238320      
Type Roadway      
Market Condition Normal      
Total Project Estimate 7,534,000      
Total Project Direct 
Cost Estimate 5,725,840      
Reasonable 
Acceleration Days 117      
Estimated  RUC/Day 3,500      
       








Cost (+/- $) 
Direct cost  81% 76% 5,725,840 8% 380,768 
 Labor 25% 25% 1,431,460 20% 286,292
 Materials 45% 45% 2,576,628 5% 128,831
 Equipment 30% 30% 1,717,752 -2% (34,355)
 Subcontractor 0% 0% 0 0% -
     
Indirect cost  6% 8% 629,842 1% 8,589 
 Supervision 2% 2% 114,517 10% 11,452
 Time-related 
facilities 1% 1% 57,258 -5% (2,863)
 Non-time-related 
facilities 1% 1% 57,258 0 -
 Mobilization/demo 3% 5% 286,292 0 -
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bilization 
 Insurance and 
taxes 1% 2% 114,517 0 -
     
Markup  12% 15% 1,408,557 12% 143,146 
 Risk 3% 5% 286,292 50% 143,146
 Home office G&A 8% 10% 572,584 0% -
 Profit  9.1% 9.60% 549,681  
     
Total   100% 7,764,239 8% 532,503 
  
 
    
Acceleration Cost 532,503     
I/D Incentive Profit 109,661   
Total Incentive Amount 642,164     
aStated as a percentage of total project cost 
b Stated as a percentage of total direct cost
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Findings 
During the course of this project, several findings were made with respect to 
estimate incentive amount and incentive duration using the three models in the case study. 
The general findings are as follows: 
1. Compared with the Shr and Chen’s model and the PMI method, the Sillars and 
Riedl’s model takes more time and effort to use. The results of the Sillars and Riedl’s 
model depend more on the situation of the particular project and display greater 
uncertainty than the other two models. 
2. For most of the case, the PMI method has a lowest incentive amount among all the 
results of the three models. This incentive amount will probably not provide enough 
encouragement to the contractor for acceleration. 
3. It is quite probable that the Shr and Chen’s model has the largest result of incentive 
amount, which is more suitable to be used as the upper bound of incentive amount 
setting. Compared with the Shr and Chen’s model and the PMI method, the Sillars 
and Riedl’s model is likely to have a more reasonable incentive amount, which is 
neither too large nor too small. But calculation results of the Sillars and Riedl’s model 
does not include the incentive duration, which needs to be provided by the other two 
models or other method.  
4. When the Shr and Chen’s model has the largest incentive amount among the results 
of the three models, the two results of incentive duration calculated by the Shr and 
Chen’s model and the percentage as maximum incentive amount method are similar. 
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5. When in a particular project which has a relatively large contract amount, and a 
relatively small daily RUC and contract duration, the Sillars and Riedl’s model is 
likely to have a larger result of incentive amount than the Shr and Chen’s model.  
6. When the Sillars and Riedl’s model has the largest incentive amount, the incentive 
durations calculated by the Shr and Chen’s model and the percentage as maximum 
incentive amount method are not close. 
7. The equation, CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC, is the basic factor used in I/D amount setting. All 
the models evaluated in this project have either included the equation in its basic 
philosophy, or applied the equation in its post-calculating verification. 
Conclusions 
Through data collection concerning I/D amount setting models, and case studies 
focusing on the outcomes of each model, it is apparent that there are marked differences 
among the usage and results of each model. This directed project finds that for one 
particular highway project using I/D contracting, there appears to be great differences in 
I/D amount by choosing different I/D amount setting method. It is also confirmed that the 
equation CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC is the basic theory of I/D. No matter what method is used 
when setting the incentive, the equation CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC can be applied to the 
process of setting for the purpose of calculation or verification. 
Recommendations 
 EVALUATION OF I/D CONTRACTING METHOD    47 
 
The following recommendations are based on the knowledge gained from this 
research: 
1. For a better result of incentive amount, the DOT can apply each of the models for a 
particular project. After comparing and adjusting the different results, a final result 
can be determined, which will satisfy the basic requirements and be fair and attractive 
to each party involved. 
2. For projects that are in extreme need of acceleration, the percentage as maximum 
incentive amount method might not be a good choice for setting incentive amount for 
DOTs. In such a case, the DOT might need to consider the other two models.   
3. When the portion of a project has a relatively high RUC and the incentive duration 
has been set relatively long, the Sillars and Riedl’s model is a better choice for the 
DOT. 
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